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by 
Renry  Slater 
l!Jy research is concerned with try- to unravel the changing gattern 
of economic and social relationships operative in the rural areas of ITatal 
during the period 1820 to 1913, as a first step towards a political econony of 
this particular region of southern Africa. In this paper I have chosen to look 
at juot one element in this cbging situation, the operations of the formidable 
London-based iyatal Land and Colonisation Company, which was formed in 1860 as 
the product of a meeting Setween South African speculative holders of ITatal 
lads and representatives of British finance capital. 
The origins of the colonial landooming class, whose representatives 
_~,artici?ated in this meeting, lie in the structural conditions prevailing during 
the earliest years of the colonial era in Natal. Land speculation had be,- 
even before the commercial expansion of the Cape had culninated in tne 
voortrelrlrer Iiepublic of ITatalia being annexed as a British colony in 1843. (1) 
lluch the same process m q  have attended Imperial expansion elsewhere. The land 
speculation which preceded the annexation of Mew Zealand in 1840 is one example 
~rhich comes to mind. (2) 
In Iiatal, a combination of circumstances favoured the subsequent 
development of this process. These included the particular policy the Imperial 
Government chose to apply to l a d  in Natal; the eagerness of the majority of 
the Dutch colonists to dispose of their land claims cheaply in order to migrate 
across the Drdcensburg awa,y from the evils they associated witn colonial rule; 
the close relationship between some of the speculators and government 
agencies (3); and the difficulty of realizing a cash surplus from farming in 
the face of few masket opportunities and their monopoly by African producers 
>rho alone controlled the labour power necessaq for the economic production of 
surplus crops at that time. The consequence was that the market, in the land 
resources of Natal claimed by the colonizers, continued to be flooded with vast 
acreages offered at very low prlces at a time when relatively few men controlled 
tne necessary capital resources to purchase and hold land. A small group of 
ITatal and Cape-based merchants were able, by cash purchase or in settlement of 
commercial debts, to build up substantial holdings of Natal lands. i3y 18C7, 13 
mercantile firns claimed 62 farms totalling 230,000 acres, for which payment at 
about 26 an acre had been made. (4) 
The same stmtural conditions which had favoured the emergence of a 
clase of large landownera in Natsl, alongside and partly drawn from the ranks of 
the merchant class, inhibited their replacement by a successful class of 
capitalist famers. Compounding the problems of market conditions and Africm 
competition were those of labour supply and the absence of local capital. h 
inportant theme in  the eazly history of Natal is the struggle of the land6wni~ 
clarts to overcome OS circumvent these problems. 
The initial stragety of the landowners was to present Natal as a 
favourable field for immigration fmm Europe, particularly of small capitalists 
prepaxed to undertake faxming. 3irrmigration along these lines would widen the 
nmket for local produce, provide the necessary capital for farming, and push 
up the value of land adjacent to the areas of such activity. bWogistic accounts 
of the colonyls famring possibilities and of the successes of early settlers were 
published in Europe, crop experiments were run to give credence to tne claims, 
and other means used to create the illusion of a flourishing farming cornunity of 
lute colonists. 
For a time it seemed as t h o u  the 1andor.mersl efforts would prove 
successful. ITatal did come to be regarded as a possible field for the 
settlement of European emigrants. The interests of the IJatal lando~mers 
coincided with those of powerful British shipping interests. At the same time, 
the British Government, together with influential private parties such as the 
LIethodist movement, was interested in emigration as a neans of checking Yne 
revolutionary potentisl of the "Hungry Forties". Under various schemes which were 
the product of this unholy alliance, some 5,000 British emig~ants settled in 
Natal between 1849 and 1852, a tiny number compared to the North American and 
Australasian emigrations of the same period. By this means the tiny colonial 
population of Natal was increased from 3,000 in 1846 to 7,629 in 1852. 
The acreage allowed to each settler under the majority of the Natal 
schemes was sufficiently small for the speculators to have reason to hope that 
immigrants would purchase further lands on the open market. Though a few did so, 
the majority sought an income fmm trade with Africans or with the Dutch 
pastomlists of the interior, from the transport industry which developed asound 
this trade, fmm hunting, from woodcutting, or from various urban occupations. 
It was usual, in fact, for one man to combine or alternate a number of these 
activities. Some would add to their range of interests the slow and painful 
development of small-scale mixed fanning. As their correspondence reveals, not 
a few of the ealy British settlers were kept afloat by a subsidy from relatives 
and friends in the metropolis. (5) Only a handful of men sought to extract a 
living solely from the land, and then in plantation crops such as cotton, coffee, 
arrowroot and sugar, which would not place them in competition with African 
producers of the basic foodstuffs of maize, kaffir corn, vegetables and, perhaps, 
livestock. African dominance of the market in these items is a feature remarked 
upon in letters and other writings of the time. (6) i3y 1860, however, the 
activities of the c3lonial planters had yet to bear fruit, largely owing to 
African resistance to measures designed to force them into labour for White 
employers. It was to be some years before agricultural produce was to overtake 
the production of hunters and pastoralists in Natalls export statistics. In 
these circumstances the market in land remained depressed, and the leading 15 
speculators remained in possession of 700,000 acres. (7) 
One response of the landowners to this continuing picture of 
stagnation in the colonial sector of Natal's rural economy was to seek to renove 
the key obstacle to which the planters constantly referred, 'Ilabour snortage". 
The landowners joined forces with those colonists who sou@ to put their 
farmina; operations on a commercial footing in demanding, preferably under the 
control of the colonists themselves, a "native policy" which would have as  i t s  
object the forcing of Africans in to  iihite employment. In the short term, the 
Governinent should import labour fron outside t o  meet the planters! needs. Jonas 
3er,Tneil and Adolph Coqui, by 1860 the two largest  landowners in lu'atal* tri.th 
106,100 and 62,165 acres, respectively, were anongst the men who chose to  use 
the i r  position i n  the iJatal legis lat ive council to  campaign f o r  such a policy. (8) 
?hey were successful i n  pressuring the Iuperial  representatives i n  Katal into 
canctioning a scheme f o r  introducing indentured labour from India, but, for  
reasons v~hich I discuss l a t e r ,  they were l e s s  successful i n  the f i e l d  ,f "nstive 
policy". 
A second s t r a t e ~ y  of the lruzdo~ming class  involved ciilcunventing the 
shortzm of local cap i ta l  by drawing upon the ccipital resmurce: of: ths  zeet~:opolis 
i t s e l f .  aergtheil  and Coqui were the men a t  the centre of tlie main scheme. A t  
a neeting of large landholders held i n  lu'atal i n  April 1853, ijergtlneil s i d e d  
t,tlrou& a groposal which envisaged the se t t ing  up of a joint stock conpany that 
would purchase some of the speculative lands i n  iTatal and, by expediting 
immigration, push up the value of the renainder. The Canada Land Compaay was to  
be the model f o r  the operation. Lando~mers who sold land to  the Company vould 
be coa3easated i n  t i e  Compaayls slmres. (9) By July 1859, 196,471 acres had 
been >led@ to  the schene and Coqui hastened to  London t o  open up negotiations 
with Bri t ish financiezs. 11, board b r i s t l i ng  t i t h  prominent metropolitan naaes 
was recruited, and i n  August 1861 the IJatal Land and Colonisation Conpaay f ina l ly  
vent public with a. nominal share capi tal  of C225,000 in £10 units.  It now 
claimed t o  control 2L7,OOO acres of Natal lands. (10) Offering the tangible 
asset  of nearly a quarter of a million acres of land i n  a 'We~eloping'~ colony, 
together with various other seeningly lucrative income poss ib i l i t i es ,  the 
Cornany was floated successfully, joining the ever-spreaUg network of London- 
based lcmd, comercial,  r a i l m y  and mining companies ~rhose in te res t s  reached to  
tile f a r  corners of eapire and begond. A f i n a l  problem remained t o  be overcome. 
To enable the Conpw to  hold land in Natal on such a scale r~i thout  the 
intervention of trustees,  s ~ e c i a l  egis lat ion would be required. But v i th  
aorrerful friends i n  London, and with several Company men i n  tine t iny ITa-tal 
legis lat ive council, t h i s  seems t o  have posed l i t t l e  problem. Goodricke, the 
Company so l ic i tor ,  moved the f i r s t  reading of the necessary b i l l ,  and Goqui 
hurried back from London in time t o  p i lo t  through the second. (11) 
Over the following few years, in a gentlemanly stampede led  by Coqui 
which the Corapaay only just nanztgpd t o  control, the handful of ;iatal 
speculators interested i n  tlie Company unloacled on the London stoc!; market tile 
shares tritn rrhich the Conpaay had purchased the i r  lands. (12) The nature of t he i r  
p rof i t  lw part ly  i n  the price the Compaay chose t o  pay f o r  t h e i r  lads, im 
avexage of 7/6 m acre upland and $2 an acre coastland (13) compared to the 
local prevailing price of a few pence per acre, though th i s  was probably of fse t  
by the need to  r e se l l  the shares at something less  than t he i r  ?as value. It lay 
nore especially i n  the f ac t  t h a t  a market had been found at a l l  and tha t  capi tal  
had been freed t o  reinvest i n  nore productive operations, or, as  i n  Coquits case, 
fo r  tiie settlement of outstanding debts. 3y 1870 almost tine rrhole of tiie 
Company's share capi ta l  was firmly in the hands of s m a l l  private Bri t ish 
investors, amongst tinon members of that  popular Victorian profession of 
"pntleaen" were doninant. (14) Only Semens, Coqui's erstwhile c o m e ~ c i a l  
associzte since the days of t l e  Republic of Natalia, and Ber&neil retained a 
direct  in te res t  i n  the Company. Behrens becane the ITatal n a l w r  3ergtheil  
:!a3 ZOOil  $0 join the Londoa board. 
A t  l e a s t  tjnree other groups of landowners seem to  llave sought to  draw 
upon .~e t ropol i t=  capi tal  i n  a similar fashion, but more interest ing i s  one 
particulclar speculative maoeuvre which fai led to  pt off tiie mound. Zn 1362, 
that  intrepid t r i o  0," Coqdi, 3ergkileil and Behrens , together 76th the ITatcl L a d  
and Colonisation Company, were negotiating througo. John Dunn (a colonist turned 
Zulu chief) to buy for 23,000 a sizable portion of the Zulu homeland from PIpande 
and his successor as Zulu paramount, Cetywayo. (15) In August the directors of 
the Coqany had got as far as sending to 3ergtheil and Bebens a draft deed of 
cession >rith the instruction 
'l.,. trusting that you will get the grant secured 
in the most effectual way possible so as to 
facilitate our movements in obtaining the 
recognition and sanction of Government with the 
view to meration of this territory to tine Colow. 
The Company will pay half the purchase price, 
messrs Coqui and yourselves the remainder." (16) 
According to Dunn, only the il~tra~lsi@nce of the Zulu indunas prevented the deal 
from ming through (17), so we shall never know how effective the Company night 
have been in shaping the bou?daries of tk2 Colony. 
IIaving been launched successfully, the Company now began to 1004 for 
ways through which to ensure its long term profitability. Promotion of railway 
development and of further W,.-ration from Europe were bro of the means by which 
the Company hoped to push up the value of its lands and encourage faming in the 
colonial sector of Ilatall S rural econoqy. In both cases the Company envisaged that 
the bulk of the capital involved trould be provided by the state. 30th. schemes 
were vetoed by the Imperial Government in London, probably at the instigation of 
Lt Governor Scott, who was not prina;rily interested in the future of ITatal ss a 
colony of White settlement. iiaving failed to win this particular round, in 1866 
Dergtheil retired from his vantage point in tie Natal legislative council, from 
which he had guided the esllrly fortunes of the Compaqy,to take up a position on 
the London board, a directorship he was to hold until his death in 1301. 
The Company's clash with the Imperial Government on these issues was, 
in fact, one aspect of a much wider struggle which revolved around the question 
of the manner in which surplus should be extrzcted from the colonized population, 
lfhilst some representatives of Imperial authority accepted the colonial farmers' 
vision of the development of Natal society and sought to evol~e a "native polica" 
designed to meet the labour requirements of this group, others looked to the 
efforts of African peasant producers to create the export surplus needed to make 
the Colony pay its way in the Empire. The activities of Lt Governor Pine with 
his substantial personal stake in the efforts of the colonists (18), and of 
Lt Governor Scott with his scheme to enforce payment of hut tax solely in cotton, 
and his sunning battle with the elected members of the Natal legislative council 
on tne issue of "native policy" (lg), were perhaps extremes indicative of the 
anbivalence in Imperial policy to~rards the Colony. 
The merchant and missionary interests, which in nost other colonial 
situations seem to have leaned towards chanpioning a vision of the colonized as 
~roducers of eqort crops and consumers of imported mufactures, were also,in 
Ilatal, more uncertain in their thinking. As we have suggested, a number of the 
more prominent Natal merchants maintained a secondary or even prinarj interest in 
land speculation, and many missionaries included farming amongst tneir interests. 
There was to be no coherent voice from these sources in defence of a free African 
peasantry. 
The situation was complicated further as a result of many Lbite 
landovmers reaching the conclusion that the key to wealth lay in the exploitation 
of the existing "developedtt sector of iJatal's rural econoqy based on the kraal 
as the productive unit, rather than in awaiting a transfomtion of tne prevailing 
s t a t e  of "underde~elopment~~ in the colonial sector, a t ras l s fomt ion  :Liich 
showed l i t t l e  sign of coming about of its own accord. For these men, md the 
Uatal Laad and Colonisation Company was t o  join them, the extraction of rent  i n  
the form of cash o r  crops from African tenants constituted the most a t t rac t ive  
form of "farmingq1. The in te res t s  of ~ ~ t e  landown r and struggling colonial 
farmer, which had once seemed to  be i n  sympathy, now begm t o  diverge, and by 
Yne end of the century this had become one of the main axes of confl ic t  
within the White community of Natal. 
A "native policy" was evolved which took account of these many 
conplications of the situation. The s ta te ,  t b o u &  tne courts, would defend the 
r ight  of Ilhite landlords t o  extract rent  from Africans l iv ing  on tne land which 
they claimed t o  own, but the necessary surplus could be accumulated throug22 
production f o r  the market, transport operations, trade o r  whatever. Labour f o r  
colonists would not be insis ted upon. I f  landlords chose to  o f f e r  only a labour 
tenancy relationship, the s t a t e  would not interfere  t o  nrevent Africans fA-om 
nigcatinc onto other lands. A t  the same time, the embryo cap i t a l i s t  
afgicultural sector of the economy would not be allo~red t o  suffer. The system 
of bpor t ing  indentured l2bour from outside Itatal, which the colonial fanners 
and the i r  a l l i e s  had or iginal ly  envisaged as a stop-gap measure, cane to  be a 
permanent feature of the economic system. Labour of this kind was drawn from 
India, i>Iozanbique, and from Pefugees of the Zulu s tate .  Only the s t a t e  i t s e l f  
reserved the r igh t  t o  levy compulsory labour f o r  road construction. ITot u n t i l  
the large-scale development of farming in the co lonia l~sec tor , fn  the aftermath 
of the mineral discoveries a t  Yaberley and the '>titwatersrand, did the balance 
of social and po l i t i ca l  forces a l t e r  i n  such a vray that the s t a t e  moved t o  close 
off those avenues t o  the means of subsistence open t o  Africans ~ h i c h  were 
alternative t o  labour f o r  White colonists. 
The Natal Land and Colonisation Company bras not, of course, o d y  
concerned with creating the conditions to  ensure i t a  long-tern profitabili t jr .  
One of i ts  f i r s t  moves bras t o  seek t o  benefit from that same local  shortage of 
capi tal  ~rhich had brought about i t s  formation. In February l862 a debenture 
issue of E150,OOO bearing 6$: ~ m s  autliorized, which was t o  be invested i n  loans 
i n  iTatal bearing the colonial in te res t  r a t e  of 127;. The loans would be secured 
a s  f i r s t  mortgages on the lands owned by the borrowers. (20) There proved to be 
a high demand fo r  such mortgdges at the relat ively favourable r a t e  offered by the 
Conpany, not l ea s t  by sugar planters anxious t o  par t ic ipate  i n  the newly 
organized Natal Government scheme f o r  the importation of indentured labourers 
from India. (21) It was not, however, t o  be long before the Company had a tas te  
of the reason why in te res t  ra tes  i n  Natal were often as  hi& as  25;;. The 
outbreak of the Basuto/orange Free State Ialar quickly produced a commercial c r i s i s  
i n  Xatal, f o r  Natal's economy - or, rather,  the colonial sector of it - was veq- 
dependent upon the overbere; trade with the Boer republics a t  t h i s  time, so tha t  
the interruption of t h i s  trade had calamitous resul ts .  The commercial systen had 
been based on an endless c red i t  network, so tha t  the collapse of the Leading 
merchant firm of Paw and ~:iilkinson quickly spread. Underpinning the whole 
commercial system were mortgages on land. A contemporary observer t e l l s  us the 
extent t o  ~ ~ h i c h  the Company had become involved: 
"Here I may say that about t h i s  period the whole of 
South AXrica was i n  a s t a t e  of bankruptcy. From 
what I ccluld make out, most of the land ~ m s  mortga&-ed 
to  the itatal Land and Colonisation Company. This was 
between 1864. and 1866. l' (22) 
In fac t ,  by 1866 the Company had E220,OOO t i e d  up i n  nortgages i n  Katal., on the 
bulk of ~rhich in te res t  and repayments had ceased t o  come in. (23) I t s  dividend 
had fa l len  to  5-2:, and by 1068 had disappeared completely. (24) In t h i s  year the 
Company b e p  t o  foreclose on those mortgagees who had defaulted. Foreclosure 
and purchase i n  the market at re la t ive ly  low prices continued throu&out the 
years of depression and subsequent uncertainty. ?3y 1874 the Conpanjr or.ined 
657,967 acres i n  Natal, which seems t o  have been the peak f igme  reached & a i n g  
i ts history. (25) Further debenture issues had been necessary to  complete t h i s  
phase of acquisition. 
The period from 1870 t o  about 1890 saw the Co~~azly s t rugg l in~ ;  to  
consolidate i t s  an-nual income t o  a point there its heavy debenture debt could be 
d i o c k g e d  and a regular dividend paid on its ordinary share capi tal .  There tiere 
several means used by the Company in order to  t r y  t o  bring about this pesition, 
including comercial agriculture (rather  half-hearted, a id  f i na l ly  abandoned i n  
1083 a f t e r  heavy losses), mineral prospecting, mortgagr? loans and apncy  
operations. Eut the Company's main sources of income proved t o  be the sa le  of 
lands asld the collection of rents  of various kinds. 
Land sales  by the Company broug;ht about a f a l l  in the a c r e a s  i t  
controlled, from 657,967 acres i n  1874 t o  433,343 acres i n  1890. The dianond 
and g ~ l d  rushes in the in t e r io r  had broken the grip of tne economic depression 
in iTatal and the steady sales of the Company from about 1873 ref lected this .  i3ut 
it seems t o  have been the substantial  profi ts  made by many ITataliar-S, both ;{kite 
and Blacl:, during the Zulu !Jar which produced the Company1s f i r s t  rea l  l a d  boon 
i n  the period 1879 t o  1882. In the four years ending i n  1877, 80,000 acres had 
been sold, but in the year 1880 alone more than 40,000 acres passed out of the 
hands of the Company, at an average of 16/- per acre. Almost a l l  these land 
sales  were concentrated i n  the in t e r io r  counties of Klip River, Umvoti, :,eenen, 
and p8,rticularly in Pietermaritzburg. Conditions in al l  these counties favoured 
pastoral fa.ming. By contrast,  the Company was actually s l igh t ly  increasing i t s  
holdings in the two main coastal counties of Durban and Victoria, whilst i t s  
acreage i n  Alexandra shoved l i t t l e  change. Sales slumped i n  the post-rrar 
depression, and income from t h i s  source win cane t o  exceed tne 1C75 figure o f i y  
i n  1890. (26) 
It i s  d i f f i cu l t  to  work out just  what changes in Katal's rural econow 
were reflected in these sales,  though I shall attempt t o  argue here tha t  they were 
not primarily associated with any major development of farming ac t iv i ty  on the part  
of the colonists. Cecil Rhodes, a tenant of the Company i n  iTatal (27), bras not 
the only planter t o  abandon the struggle of trying to make a l iv ing  from the so i l .  
A b i t t e r  outburst made in 1875 by the mother of one struggling colonial fani ly  
provides, I think, the clue: 
"I expect it w i l l  be a long time before we a l l  meet 
again f o r  Ted and Fred have taken a farn overberg. 
I f ee l  very much t h e i r  going away so fa r ,  but it 
seems impossible f o r  anything t o  be done i n  Natal 
while everything is managed so badly; there i s  no 
labour t o  be g ~ t  and there is  no competing with the 
natives as t'ney are  l a r8  gmwers, al l  b v e  tragons 
and oxen, and having so few wants can afford to  
s e l l  and treclr at a much cheaper r a t e  than the 
Engglish. 3esides which it [the O r a n g e  Free State] 
i s  a good sheep and wheat country . . . I an 
distressed beyond measure t o  think that our bogs 
w i l l  leave Natal t o  s e t t l e ,  but I know things cannot 
long go on i n  peace here unless mat c m s  are  
made with the native rule." (28) 
Changes were to  come, but not yet. The voice of fne colonial farner 
was not yet strong enou& t o  overcome tha t  of the powerful colonizl and 
netronolitan in te res t s  rrho had stake i n  the contimed incone capacity of iiatal 
A£ricans. It r t s  estimated that i n  1874 no l e s s  t:an 5 n i l l i o n  acres of ;;atal 
lands i n  the hands of private colonists o r  land com~anies rrere occupied by 
Africans. (29) A colonist i n  1881 tilougit it quite possible f o r  a rent-nzyiny 
tenant t o  sake 660 a yeas fron cultivation and mrovement of stoc!:. Such nen 
did n ~ t  r e t i r e  to  the locations, since Ison farms they are  nearer to  the 
naxket". Often, however, the landlord insis ted on providing the market ninself 
fo r  "most of the fanners adre t h e i r  tenants give tneen the refusal  of t h e i r  
mealie crop" (go), thereby addbg  to  the surplus tney derived from African 
producers i n  the forn of rent. A good deal of the lands sold by the Con3anjr to  
col~i?iat:: were said to  be s t i l l  occupied by hmriczl?s rho nor: furnished the i r  
raits to the nerr landlords. (31) The instalnents on the plU3ol=se price of Cram 
lands were also found t o  be paid by colonises s u b - l e t t k ~  to " Tricans. 
African tenants played a major p a r t  in the renting operations oY the 
ITatal Land and Colonisation Conpany. Except during the boon years 1879-1862, the , 
Conpayls rental  income in the ~ e r i o d  1870-1830 seems alvrays t o  have e::ceeded 
the prof i t s  from land sales. It vas, i n  fac t ,  alrrays tile C o n p ~ ~ ~ y l s  ain t o  reduce 
sales of i t s  only capi tal  asset ,  and one rrhich \,-as l ike ly  t o  continue to  r i s e  in 
value, so as  to  preserve the C o q a y l s  ca7acity t o  produce future inconc. The , 
t o t a l  income tile Company derived from rents stood in 1880 a t  nearly 510,000. 1 
This fifpre was more or  lecs  equal.ly divided between torm zents, rents  collected l 
on l a ~ d s  leased i n  rura l  areas, and rents collected from Africarrs primarily on a 
hut by hut basis rather  tim on acreaL* occ~~pied. By 1830 t h i s  figure had been 
3ushed up to  over Cl3,000, irhich should be concared rdth the : ~ r o l i t  on l a d  sales  
fo r  that year of only C2,773. Though a l l  %wee sources of reiital incone 
contributed t o  this increase, the largest jump r.ras in  the hut rents  collected 
Prom Africans, ~rhich now furnished 427: oz" the Companyls t o t a l  incone from 
rents. (33) Conpany rents in the early 1880s seem t o  have m g e d  between 21 and 
23 per hut, with ploughs available a t  S2 or  C3 extra. (3L; )  It t z s  t h i s  source of 
incone ~rhich, above all,  nlayed a d;manic role  i n  the Con9a;l~r's push t o ~ , ~ , r d s  
grosperity. 
In a remarkably accurate gro~hesy,  Iheopliilus Sheps tone, i n  h i s  evidence 
to  the 1681/2 ilatal Native M f s i r s  Comission, drew at tent ion to  the Con~~yU."s 
specizl position i n  the r ~ x z 1  areas: 
"1 think vre have nosr i n  the counJ~ry a l l  the elenenta 
vrl~ich a re  l ike ly  to  bring about serious a[>zarim 
disturbances ... Sun?ooe tne kmd and Colonisation 
Compctny should f ind it necessary t o  rcnove a l l  the 
natives from t h e i r  f-S, the Government would be 
bound t o  remove them, and whzt vrould become of then? 
I believe such a thing rrould d i rec t ly  o r  indirect ly  
a f fec t  70,000 o r  80,000 na,tives, and f o r  such a lax* 
number t o  be czpable of being affected by a land 
question i s  a very serious consideration, and th i s  
sho~rs tha t  we are  very nuch at the nercy of 
circumstances. 'l ( 35) 
3ut, before tmcin:: the c W @ s  which made Shepstone's nrophesy eccllrate, 
it remains t o  exanine tile Compmyts position a t  the end of the 1870-1090 period. 
As a resu l t  of the ac t iv i t i e s  we have described, the Com~,any's debenture debt h ~ d  
been cut From E122,250 i n  1.383 t o  a nodest Zj3,000 i n  1032, and new renevrals \rere 
o n l j  made a t  L;;'/: compared to  tlie 8:': t!?at had once been necesszry. A nore 
s imi f i can t  indicator of the Companyts new prosperity was that its bener"iciaries 
had widened from a se lec t  group of directors a~ld  debenture holders t o  include its 
e r d i n a ~ j  shareholders. Fron 1892 the Company began, f o r  the f i r s t  time since 
,, ,, steadi ly 1867, to  pay a regular dividend on its ordinary shares - z t iny  l?''
increasing to a peak of 15:: in 1903. A third indicator was tie gtxnring interest 
of institutional investors in the Company, the National Provincial Bank anongst 
them. So far as the directors were concerned, the real cause for celebration h a s  
that the increase in the rent roll meant that the Company was at last freed from 
a dependence upon land sales to meet its commitments. (36) As we have suggested, 
a good deal of this prosperity derived from the income cremed,with the backinc 
of the state, from the African population of Natal. iIoreover, additional to hut 
rents, part of the Company's income fron land sales, and perhaps even from rural 
leases, was also drawn fron this source. &t, then, rent I ~ S  merely the most 
obvious of a number of ways through vhich the African fasner provided not onl;i 
the means of subsistence for his people but also a substantial subsidy to tile 
economic activities of the colonists and certain groups in the metropolis. 
Shepstone lmd been concerned that the Company mi&t one day begin to 
evict its African tenants. This was, .in a sense, what began to hapnen by the 
turn of the century, though tne mechanisn was a little more complicated tim he 
majr have envisaged. \hat actuallj hagpened was that the Company, in comon 
with other landowners in ITatal, began once more to sell off large screa&-es, and 
the heavy exactions demanded by the new landlords from tile existing tenants 
completed the process. Both economic and political forces can be shown to have 
played roles in bringing about this change, though to separate them for the 
purpose of analysis is really to mislead. \,'hat, in fact, was takinf: place at 
this time was a far-reaching change in the structure of the political economy of 
Iat al. 
The catalyst for the process was the development of the mining industr,., 
notably of the goldfields of the \?itwatersrand, but also of the coalfields of the 
Iaip River district in the ktal interior. iTatal lay abreast one of tine important 
transport arteries bettreen the coast and the mining areas. A vast internal 
market opened up for its timber, sugar, maize and dairy produce. Intensive 
branch-line construction served to link to the main  transport routes the rural 
areas capable of exporting these products. A boost was given to the mercantile 
activities in the urban centres, and to the beginnings of secondary industrj. 
Develo-oment in all these sectors bro-t about z. substmtial increase in the 
price of land and a marked intensification of the demand for labour. 
In this context, the commercial fanners and others >rho bou&t land fron 
the Compmy or elsewhere 1ool:ed upon African tenants as a potential labour sup~ly 
rather than as a direct source of income. I'Rent and Labour" or simply "labourtt 
began to be the form of tenancy insisted upon. Chief W b i  Zulu found that the 
land on which his people had lived as tenants for a generation had been sold over 
their heads. The new owner was the Dundee Coal Company, which refused the offer 
of rent and demanded 800 men a year to be supplied to the Conpany. iIaving moved 
elsewhere, Chief Kmbi heard t i t  some "Amanhlengatt fron Durban were to 5e placed 
on the farm in his stead. (37) Everywhere the existing pattern of relntionshios 
vras being upset. Chief PTdungels problem was that 
"All the farmers in qy district are putting all their 
land into rmttles and will not permit their native 
tenants to renab on the farms. They are even 
disposing of their stock.tt (38) 
The Crovm land on which Chief Sibanuts people had been living was norr taken over 
by fanners : 
"\.!e all otm a certain mount of stock and the farners 
complain that this interferes with the grazing of 
theirs, and in consequence are ordering our removal 
from their lands ... We are all hard pressed by the 
farmers, and we appeal to Government to assist 
us, to give us sone place where we can have a 
little rest." (39) 
Pockets of rent tena,ncy remained, but at heavy cost to the tenants. To meet 
increasing rents, promissory notes bearing usurious interest rates were commonly 
given, and ~arhen these could not be met creditors confiscated stock or sent 
debtors under contract to labour - notably at the tfit~mtersrand @ld mines. 
Banbatha was one chief whose people (scattered amongst Idhite-o'tmed farms in 
the Umvoti, Mew Iianover and Lions Biver divisions, at the heart of the developing 
wattle and dairying belt of the iTatal midlands) 'trere in this desperate 
position, (SO) The Barnbatha iiebellion, Shepstone's ag~arian disturbances if you 
like, was to break out in 1306. 
Par from the state intervening to ease the situation developing in the 
mxal areas as a result of the economic forces generated by mining activity and 
its corollary of capitalistic farming, it vras already bxsy seeking to find other 
means by which a class of relatively independent African producers, furnishing 
little or no labour to colonial employers, could be destroyed. A political 
element had been added to the economic. The change had been brought about by a 
cllange in tile composition of state power. The advent of "responsible @vernmentn 
iSatal in 1833 heralded the advent of thecon- of the state by the elected 
representatives of the :.kite colonists. Rural constituencies returned the vast 
najoritj of the members of the legislature, and in these, as we have seen, the 
balance of social forces was moving in favour of the burgeoning class of commewial 
farmem and its allies, and to the detriment of absentee rentiers. The state 
moved forward on two main fronts, firstly to prevent Africans from purchasing any 
more land to add to the quarter of a nillion acres tney had bought by 1905 (41), 
and,secondly, by means of taxation and compulsory purchase to reduce further the 
acreage available for rent tenancy. The significaace of cl-ximges in tile 
availzbility of private lands to Africans in ITatal o w t  not to be dismissed 
i i y  In 1905 they carried nearly twice the population of the locations. (42) 
The Natal Land and Colonisation Company was painfully a r m  of its 
increasing inability to resist the attacks made upon it by the colonial fanners 
in its capacity as the leading "kafir farmer". Ey the late 1890s it had embarked 
on a new phase of its history. !.ikilst fi&ting a rear-guard action against the 
p o ~ ~ i n ~  porrer of the farmins and nining sectow of the ifatal political economy 
(and, as late as 1908, it was po'trerful enough to ensure that taxation specifically 
desised against the Company only renained on the statute book for one year), it 
srritched its attention from African renting to its other profitable and less 
politically undesirable interest in urban renting. Rural lands were sold off 
whenever possible, and the capital freed by this means reinvested in the purchase 
of urban properties or the development of esisting urban sites controlled by the 
Company. 
The Company, having successfully negotiated the changes in ITatal's 
political economy which tie have described, retained its attraction for 
institutional investors in the metropolis. In 1948, controlling a mere 3,000 
acres but with a rent roll of %73,000, the Company was finally bro-t within the 
fjnancial emire of one such organization. Though technically registered in 
South Africa as British African Properties Ltd, it was now part of the mi&ty 
&gle Star Insurance Company, where it remains to this da;y. (44) 
I h y  of the 1Tata.l Land and Colonisation Company's fomer African 
tenants also found their way into the ~o'tring urban areas of \,?lite South Africa as 
EL result of the same combination of factors which had brought about a revolutionary 
ciwge in the Company's renting policy. As one observer anticipated in 1914, 
t h e i r  a r r iva l  was to  be a l i t t l e  l e s s  auspicious. 
"At that time (twenty years a native vrorked 
s i x  montns in tne year; he was alloyed t o  keep 
as  many ca t t l e  a s  he like.  Ilo~king f o r  about 
tne same Tram on the farn every year, he finds 
that he L s  al101,:ed t o  keep l e s s  stock. %.renty 
years nearly every Xatal native vras a farner, 
loyal and contented; i n  twenty years hence I 
expect that a large proportion w i l l  l ive  i n  t i n  
houses just outside tne tovms, and the l a s t  s t a t e  
of t h a t  nan sliall  be worse than the f i r s t . "  (45) 
the course of the f i r s t  traro years of -he Re3ublic of Katalia, 1838-40, 
2.5 million acres were registered i n  favour of 254 persons, only !3 of ~rhon 
seen personally to  lmve occupied t n e i r  grants: A. G. Iiattersley, The Bri t ish 
Settlement of Natal: A Study i n  Bmerial iiirratioii (canbridge, 1950), pp. 
$6/7. Two of the active puchasers  were Adolph Coqui and Car1 Behrens. The 
significance of these tvro nancs w i l l  become apparent. 
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